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CRITICAL REALISM AND THE STRATEGIC-
RELATIONAL APPROACH
Bob Jessop
This essay develops a distinctive critical realist analysis of structure and
agency.1 It first describes Roy Bhaskar’s account of critical realism; then
discusses critical realism in general; next introduces Anthony Giddens’s
structuration theory and two particular applications of critical realism to
structure and agency – those of Bhaskar and Margaret Archer; and, finally,
presents a third such application based on the strategic-relational approach.
The latter goes beyond conventional analyses of the duality, dualism, or
dialectic of structure and agency by studying the recursive conditioning,
mutual coupling, and complex co-evolution of structure and agency and,
above all, by stressing the differential, spatio-temporal relationality of
structure and agency. Its advantages over other approaches should emerge
as we proceed.
CRITICAL REALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL NATURALISM
Although ‘critical realism’ is a relatively recent term and the package of
ideas linked with the Bhaskar ‘school’ is certainly distinctive and has its own
logic,2 many basic concepts and explanatory principles involved in critical
realism have a longer history. A non-partisan, non-teleological genealogy
has yet to be written. But Marx would figure as a major precursor both
philosophically and in substantive theoretical terms; and others have
independently ‘discovered’ several key themes articulated by Bhaskar and
his associates. Moreover, while the initial revival of philosophical interest in
the possibilities of critical realism in the social sciences in the last 30 years is
strongly (and legitimately) associated with Bhaskar, his own work moved
into a complex philosophical and methodological analysis of the dialectic
as the pulse of freedom and then into what many regard as a late ’theological
wrong turn’.3 In contrast, the more detailed elaboration of critical realist
arguments, the development of particular critical realist analyses, and its
application to specific explanatory and practical problems have involved
many other theorists who have arguably made much more crucial
contributions to the flourishing of critical realism in the social sciences.
It is therefore worth distinguishing critical realism in general from
particular positions and arguments developed within (or compatible with)
this general framework. Bhaskar’s work gave an initial justification for a
realist position in general but could not justify any particular realist position.
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so.4 His arguments incisively rejected alternative (non-realist) ontologies,
epistemologies, and methodologies. But they did (and could) not rule in
just one particular variant of critical realism and exclude others. For, it is
one thing to give a general transcendental justification of critical realism’s
superiority as a general account of the world and the conditions of its
scientific investigation, whether in the natural and/or social sciences. It is
another to establish the superiority of one particular critical realist ontology,
epistemology, and methodology over another located within a general critical
realist framework.5 This sort of demonstration requires other kinds of
argument and evidence based on their respective degrees of theoretical
coherence and explanatory power.
Bhaskar aimed to refound the philosophies of natural and social science
in opposition to prevailing orthodoxies and to define the relations between
their corresponding modes of scientific inquiry. He offered a transcendental
proof – based on the feasibility of successful scientific experimentation in
an open world – for the existence of real objects with naturally necessary
properties and tendencies that were nonetheless only tendentially, if ever,
actualised and so accessible to empirical observation (on the real, actual,
and empirical, see Box 1). Bhaskar also argued that science develops
according to a threefold schema:
Science identifies a phenomenon (or range of phenomena), constructs
explanations for it and empirically tests its explanations, leading to the
identification of the generative [causal] mechanism at work, which now
becomes the phenomenon to be explained, and so on. In this continuing
process, as deeper levels or strata of reality are successively un-folded,
science must construct and test its explanations with the cognitive
resources and physical tools at its disposal, which in this process are
themselves progressively transformed, modified and refined (PON, p12).
For the social sciences, Bhaskar develops an anti-positivist naturalism. This
posits that, while the natural and social sciences both adopt a relational
approach in arguing that relations rather than isolated entities should be
the primary unit of analysis and share other key ontological and
epistemological arguments too, they also differ in significant respects.
Box 1: The Real, the Actual, and the Empirical
 Real: generative structures or causal mechanisms
 Actual: events resulting from various real tendencies and counter-
tendencies in specific initial conditions
 Empirical: observations or measurements of actual events and,
in some circumstances, underlying structures or mechanisms
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Specifically, Bhaskar argues that:
the predicates that appear in the explanation of social phenomena will be
different from those that appear in natural scientific explanations and
the procedures used to establish them will in certain vital respects be
different too (being contingent upon, and determined by, the properties
of the objects under study); but the principles that govern their production
will remain substantially the same (PON, p20).
This is an essentially philosophical argument because it aims to show the
plausibility and superiority of naturalism. For example, Bhaskar argues that,
while hermeneutics claims correctly that the social world comprises a pre-
interpreted reality, it does not follow that the social world is reducible to the
ideas that people have about it. For social forms are a necessary condition for
any intentional act; their pre-existence implies their autonomy as possible objects
of scientific investigation; and their causal efficacy confirms their reality. But
human agency is required for the actualisation of these causal powers. These
principles underpin Bhaskar’s transformational model of social action (see
below), Archer’s detailed account of the development of selfhood and
collective social action, and, indeed, the strategic-relational approach.
CRITICAL REALISM IN GENERAL
Bhaskar’s critical realism is very distinctive and, in its entirety (especially as
developed in recent years), it excludes many other critical realist positions.
Thus it is worth presenting some key propositions relevant to critical realism
in general in order to compare various views on structure and agency as an
important area where possible differences among different realist positions
can be expected to occur.
Ontologically, critical realism (hereafter CR) adopts an ontological realist
position that distinguishes between the real, actual, and empirical. It
emphasizes their ‘relational’ nature, in other words, the internally necessary
and/or external contingent relations that obtain within and among these
dimensions. In particular, the naturally necessary properties of the real may
(or may not) be actualised in specific initial conditions and/or through specific
(non-) interventions. In this sense, then, the appearance of such properties
is not guaranteed but only tendential. Indeed, critical realists regard
properties and events both as necessarily contingent and as contingently
necessary. First, events are necessarily contingent because tendencies are
only ever tendential, may be opposed by counter-tendencies, and are
instantiated, if at all, in specific historical conditions. Tendencies are
themselves tendential because their operation depends on the overall
reproduction of the social relations and processes that generate them.
Because this reproduction cannot be taken for granted and depends on
other social relations and processes, how far a given tendency operates
CRITICAL REALISM AND THE STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL APPROACH     43
(disregarding for the moment whether there are counter-tendencies)
depends on the extent to which its own conditions of existence tend to be
reproduced.6 This has implications for the relation between structure and
agency and, as we shall see, for the constraining/enabling power of structures
and for the reproductive/ transformative power of agency. But, second,
critical realists also assume that events are contingently necessary because a
particular combination of tendencies and counter-tendencies in specific
historical conditions typically makes one particular outcome (or set of
outcomes) rather than another necessary. Note that this is an ontological
assumption about the objective world and remains to be demonstrated
through specific theoretical analyses and scientific inquiries that should be
grounded and explored in the epistemological field.
Epistemologically, CR distinguishes the intransitive and transitive
dimensions of scientific enquiry. Knowledge (transitive) is produced through
a continuing process of confrontation between retroductive theoretical
hypotheses about intransitive objects and evidential statements generated in
and through transitive enquiry. Retroduction involves asking what the real
world must be like for a specific explanandum to be actualised and, as such,
differs from empirical induction and logical deduction. Evidential statements
are the mediated results of investigation and so never directly reflect real or
actual phenomena. Experimentation, measurement, observation, etc., are
always contingent, fallible, and, perhaps, corrigible. For this reason, critical
realism embraces epistemological relativism. How to resolve any inconsistency
between hypotheses and evidence is determined within the prevailing
(hegemonic or dominant) rules of science but, for these rules to be accepted
as scientific, they must provide a basis for rational judgement among different
claims. These rules belong to the transitive aspect of science, of course, and
are subject to reasoned critique and development. Thus epistemological
relativism does not entail judgemental relativism, that is to say, the view that
any judgement is as good as any other. For, insofar as competing claims
refer to the intransitive world, it is often (but not always) possible to make
rational judgements between competing claims (CRES, pxi; CS, pp213-20).7
Methodologically, a search for constant conjunctions is inadequate for
generating scientific knowledge. Instead critical realists aim to discover the
necessary and sufficient conditions of a given explanandum. Simple
empirical generalisations are only acceptable in the absence of knowledge
about causal powers or mechanisms and form at best the basis for
retroduction to discover the mechanisms and other conditions that generate
them (RSS, pp20-22). This is illustrated by Lawson’s account of CR in
economics. He suggests that, insofar as one can identify demi-regularities -
non-spurious, rough and ready, partial regularities that come to dominate
restricted regions of time-space - this indicates the possible reproduction of
an underlying real causal mechanism (or mechanisms) that is being more
or less actualised in specific sets of circumstances. The identification of such
‘demi-regs’ is facilitated through comparison, the study of crises and turning
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points, and counterfactual analysis.8 More generally, explanation is only
adequate relative to a given explanandum. This can move from abstract to
concrete, that is to say by increasing concretisation of a given phenomenon
(for example from commodities in general to labour-power as fictitious
commodity to the wage relation to nominal wages to the real wage … ); and
from simple to complex, in other words, by introducing further dimensions
of a given phenomenon (such as state, capitalist state, patriarchal capitalist
state … ). No explanation is ever complete. It can always be re-defined and/
or questioned by making the explanendum more concrete and/or complex
(CS, pp213-230).
What does this imply for the social sciences? First, ontologically, CR
asserts that social forms pre-exist individuals and are a necessary condition
of their activity (this excludes voluntarism). Social forms do not exist apart
from agents’ conceptions of what they are doing (for instance casting votes)
and, in this sense, are discursive as well as material. Social actions reproduce
or transform social forms (this excludes the reification of society). Society is
an articulated ensemble of provisional tendencies and powers that exist
only as long as at least some of them are being exercised via the intentional
activity of human beings, witness runs on banks or the collapse of state
power during revolutions. Second, epistemologically, the intransitive objects
of social investigation are themselves either directly meaningful or emerge
in part from the relations among meaningful actions. This implies a ‘double
hermeneutic’9 in that what social scientists attempt to interpret is itself pre-
interpreted. This means that social science results can feed back into the
social world (transforming it) and thus requires self-reflection by social
scientists. It also implies that good explanations combine explanatory (causal)
and interpretive (hermeneutic) analysis. There are two main reasons for
this. First, CR rejects the Humean model of constant conjunctions and
Hempel’s neo-positivist, deductive nomological ‘covering law’ model of
causal analysis. And, second, ‘reasons’ can be causes. Thus an adequate
explanation of a specific historical, cultural or social phenomenon must be
adequate both in terms of motivational intelligibility (that is its social
meaning for the relevant actors) and its production by the contingent
interaction of causal processes in specific conditions.
Third, methodologically, with one proviso, the same points hold for the
social sciences as for CR in general. The key difference is that, whereas the
basic causal powers and laws of the natural world have been constant since
the formation of the universe, the social world displays few constants and
correspondingly more variation in emergent real properties across time
and place. Thus social scientists need to consider the historical specificity
and spatiality of social forms and transformation of their social properties
(for example, the embedded feudal economy vs the disembedded market
economy). This is particularly important for disciplines or inquiries
concerned with the distinctiveness of particular events or processes (whether
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counterfactual reasoning applied to the internal and external causal
conditions of the phenomena in question.10
GIDDENS, BHASKAR, AND ARCHER ON STRUCTURE AND AGENCY
The relationship between structure and agency is one of the long-standing
and defining controversies of sociological inquiry. Here I review three recent
attempts to resolve the problem: Giddens’s structuration approach, Bhaskar’s
transformational model of social action, and Archer’s morphogenetic theory.
Giddens rejects dualistic ontological treatments of structure and agency
as logically exclusive social phenomena and, a fortiori, rejects the respective
epistemological temptations of imperialism of the object (functionalism,
structuralism) and of the subject (interpretive sociologies). Instead, he defines
structure and agency as mutually constitutive – and hence, in some sense,
actually identical. On the one hand, he treats structures as sets of chronically
reproduced, deeply sedimented rules and resources that constrain and
facilitate social actions. Such structure exists only as memory traces (the organic
basis of human knowledgeability) and as it is instantiated in action at a given
point in time. On the other hand, Giddens regards individuals as more or
less knowledgeable and practically skilled actors who use these rules and
resources to reproduce social order (COS, pp17-25). In critical realist terms,
however, this argument lacks ontological depth. For it treats structure and
agency at the level of the actual rather than in terms of real mechanisms,
emergent properties, tendencies, and material effects. It also means that
Giddens must study structure and agency in terms of an alternating movement
in which he brackets (temporarily ignores) one moment of the duality when
examining the other within the same time frame. Thus, within these terms,
he treats structure at any given time in isolation from action and thereby
implies that a given structure is equally constraining and/or enabling for all
actors and all actions - simply serving (no more, but no less) as the prevailing
set of rules and resources for action. Similarly, action at any given time is
isolated from structure, since actors choose a course of action more or less
freely and skilfully within the prevailing rules and resources. This tight
imbrication generally results in a recursive reproduction of both structure
and agency, with structural transformation largely explained in terms of the
unintended consequences of social action and inaction, thereby creating new
sets of constraints and opportunities for action. Indeed, again within the
basic terms of structuration theory as Giddens presents it, there is little, if
any, recognition (let alone adequate explanation) of the differential capacities
of actors to change different structures by acting in one way rather than
another. Nor, despite his persistent and laudable efforts to integrate time
and space into structuration theory, does he consider the differential
temporalities (and spatialities) of structures as emergent properties of social
relations in their interaction with other features of the natural and social
worlds. Instead structures are assumed to continue to exist insofar as actors
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instantiate them by drawing on the relevant rules and resources and insofar
as they must take these rules and resources as given when they act.
Elsewhere, it must be admitted, Giddens goes beyond this relatively flat
ontology of structure and agency (as he defines the former) and introduces a
much deeper and richer vocabulary for the analysis of ‘structure’ as it is
understood in critical realism. In particular, having defined ‘structure’ for his
own purposes as rules and resources, he develops another set of terms to
identify emergent ‘structural properties’ that exercise various external
structural constraints over agents’ capacities for action (COS pp25, 176). These
properties include: social milieus and their time-space contextuality;
regionalisation (produced by the intersection of different locales); the ‘facticity’
of chronically reproduced, path-dependent institutional orders; institutional
‘fixity’ (structural stability); system integration (the structured coherence of
institutional orders); structural principles (the contrasting organisational bases
of tribal, class-divided, and modern societies); patterns of class domination;
and time-space edges (produced by contact between social formations with
different structural principles). Likewise, in regard to agency, Giddens is well
aware of the differential capacities of actors to constrain the actions of others
so that, while some actors can ‘make things happen’, others have things
‘happen’ to them (COS, passim). In addition, he allows for the reflexive
monitoring by agents of their conduct and their strategic situation (or the
action contexts). The aggregate effect of these additions to the structuration
approach is to re-introduce the ontological distinction between structure and
agency insofar as they are once again seen to have different emergent
properties and causal powers, different spatio-temporalities, and different
spatio-temporal horizons of action. Only by restricting the definition of
structure to rules and resources and confining agency to the manner in which
actors draw on these rules and resources can Giddens maintain that they are
mutually constitutive and effectively identical in any given action context.
Thus, because these concepts and arguments appear to be ad hoc but necessary
supplements to his basic theory, Giddens can operate with an essentially
agential view of the duality of structure and agency (denying their ontological
distinctiveness) and link his analysis with more conventional sociological
analyses of structure, agency, and strategic context.
Bhaskar introduced his transformational model of social activity (TMSA)
in similar terms to Giddens’s restricted account of the structuration
approach. He has since developed it along new and more comprehensive
lines. Bhaskar initially treated the structure-agency dualism in terms of the
ontological distinction between ‘society’ and ‘people’ and rejected three
main positions on their connection: social atomism and methodological
individualism; societal reification and methodological holism; and the
compromise view that individuals create society, society produces individuals,
and so on, in a continuous dialectic (CRES, pp212-13). Instead, proceeding
(like Archer) from the ontological distinctiveness of society and people, he
proceeds to focus on their contingent mediation through specific practices
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that are enabled as well as constrained by the societal positions that people
qua agents occupy. Society is an ensemble of structures, practices and
conventions with its own emergent properties and own material effects; but
these distinctive properties and effects are impermanent and their
reproduction (or transformation) requires the performance of appropriate
practices. Conversely, while actors are distinct from these structures (and
can therefore reflect on them and attempt to transform them), their capacity
to act and the impact of their actions depends on the specific positions they
occupy in these structures, the resources they control, their capacity to
monitor what they are doing and its effects, and, of course, the specific
actions that they perform.
Society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the
continually reproduced outcome of human agency. And praxis is both
work, that is, conscious production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction
of the conditions of production, that is, society (p215).
This model is superior to structuration as formally presented by Giddens because
it enables the analysis of the material effectivity of the emergent properties of
structures, including the division of labour and the allocation of resources.
Thus, as Archer correctly notes, while Giddens’s mediators between structure
and agency are free-floating modalities (interpretative schemes, facility, norm
or knowledge, power and convention), Bhaskar has specific slots, points of
contact, that are differentially distributed, concretely located (RST, p152).
However, as I have just noted, Giddens introduces a whole series of further
concepts to deal with what most theorists would regard as aspects of structure.
This suggests that there is actually less difference between Giddens and Bhaskar
than Archer identifies in her defence of the TSMA. And, even if we conceded
Archer’s defence, the TSMA would still be inadequate in critical realist terms
insofar as it adopts a flat temporal ontology, neglects space, and treats the
poles of structure and agency in terms of a relatively undifferentiated concept
of society and people rather than engaging with specific sets of structural
constraints and different kinds of social forces. In short, the TSMA is unilinear
and monoplanar rather than complex and stratified.
Archer’s ‘morphogenetic’ approach was an independent discovery, which
she later developed in dialogue with Bhaskar and other members of his school
(see RST). While recognising that structure and agency are interdependent,
she insisted, like Bhaskar, on their non-identity. Only thus can one explore
the changing forms and effects of the relations between structure and agency
over time and pose questions about when actors can or cannot change things,
about variations in the strength of constraints, or about what gives people
more or less freedom.11 Moreover, while her work does not operate in terms
of a sociology-psychology dualism, she focused first on the analytical dualism
of culture and people, then society and people, and, lastly, ‘culture-society’
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morphogenetic analysis, both through a critique of Giddens’s collapse of time
into crude empirical correlation and Bhaskar’s inability to deal with time in
his initial presentation of the TSMA (RST, pp154-157). Thus she claims that
morphogenesis ‘accords full significance to the timescale through which
structure and agency themselves emerge, intertwine and redefine one another’
and examines this in terms of three distinct temporal moments – structure,
interaction, and structural elaboration (RST, p76). She also seeks to avoid an
overactive view of agents as constantly engaged in social practices; an over-
socialised view of the person such that (s)he has no autonomous personality;
and an under-stratified view of actors such that they are de-centred bundles
of identities, roles, etc., without underlying motives and sense of self (RST,
pp117-32). When she attempts to develop these new theoretical principles,
however, she does so in terms of generalised taxonomies of possible forms of
social and system integration (or lack thereof) or examples drawn from her
own cross-national research on the cultural and structural elaboration of
education systems. Thus her morphogenetic approach also suffers, as does
the TSMA, from a relatively flat spatio-temporal ontology - operating basically
with past, present, and future - and hence from associated neglect of the
complex spatio-temporalities of structures, strategic contexts, and social
practice and their contingent articulation.
THE STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL APPROACH
The strategic-relational approach goes beyond all three positions (although
it is closest to morphogenetic theory). It examines structure in relation to
action, action in relation to structure, rather than bracketing one of them.
Structures are thereby treated analytically as strategically-selective in their
form, content, and operation; and actions are likewise treated as structurally-
constrained, more or less context-sensitive, and structuring. To treat
structures as strategically-selective involves examining how a given structure
may privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial
and temporal horizons, some actions over others. Likewise, to treat actions
as structurally-constrained requires exploring the ways, if any, in which actors
(individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging
through ‘strategic-context’ analysis when undertaking a course of action.12
This does not mean that actors are constantly making (self-)reflexive strategic
choices and/or providing a running commentary (as part of an ongoing
internal conversation and/or for the benefit of significant others) about their
real motives for action. But it does highlight the potential for such strategic
reflection and the role of social action in reproducing-transforming social
structures and their emergent properties. In short, the SRA is concerned
with the relations between structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and
(differentially reflexive) structurally-oriented strategic calculation.
The arrows in figure 1 depict the SRA’s logic of conceptual development
rather than some necessary historical sequence in the development of
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structure and agency or a mandatory order of presentation for empirical
analysis.13 Row one presents the inadmissible dichotomy between (absolute)
external constraint and (unconditional) free-willed action – the initial thesis
and antithesis of the movement leading to the structuration approach, the
TSMA, morphogenetic theory, and the SRA itself. Row two presents what
Bhaskar calls the ‘illicit identification’ of individual and society (and what
Archer terms ‘elisionism’ or ‘central conflation’), prompting a false dialectic
because, in seeking to transcend voluntarism and reification, it succeeds
only in combining them (CRES, pp213-214). Giddens’s work also belongs
here insofar as it sublates thesis and antithesis by reducing structure to rules
and resources (modelled on the simultaneous enabling and constraining
capacities of language) and treating agency as a structurally constrained
and enabled skilful action (analogous to parole). For different reasons,
Bhaskar’s initial presentation of the TSMA and Archer’s morphogenetic
theory also belong here. For Bhaskar referred explicitly to emergent
structures and socialised agents but allows for their mutual transformation
over time; and, while Archer introduces greater temporal depth into her
analysis of their continuing interaction, she is initially insensitive to the
always relative, relational, and differential nature of structural constraints
and capacities for reflexivity. Concepts introduced after row two in the figure
preserve the admissible elements of the preceding row(s).
The SRA makes its appearance on row three because it is more directly
concerned with particular conjunctures, including the distinctive spatio-
temporal selectivities of structures and the differential spatio-temporal
horizons and action capacities of individual and/or collective agents. Thus
the concept of structural selectivity highlights the tendency for specific
structures and structural configurations to selectively reinforce specific forms
of action, tactics, or strategies and to discourage others. Likewise the concept
of structurally-oriented strategic calculation highlights the possibility of
reflection on the part of individual and collective actors about the strategic
selectivities inscribed within structures so that they come to orient their
strategies and tactics in terms of their understanding of the current
conjuncture and their ‘feel for the game’. This can (but need not) extend to
self-reflection about the identities and interests that orient their strategies.
For individuals and organisations can be reflexive, can reformulate within
limits their own identities, and can engage in strategic calculation about
the ‘objective’ interests that flow from these alternative identities in particular
conjunctures. Together these concepts indicate that the scope for the
reflexive reorganisation of structural configurations is subject to structurally-
inscribed strategic selectivity (and thus has path-dependent as well as path-
shaping aspects); and that the recursive selection of strategies and tactics
depends on individual, collective, or organisational learning capacities and
on the ‘experiences’ resulting from the pursuit of different strategies and
tactics in different conjunctures. In turn, the strategic-relational concepts
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conjunctures and thereby bring out the evolutionary as well as radically
methodologically relational nature of the SRA.
The fifth row indicates a possible outcome of the recursive interaction
between the strategic selectivities of structures and the reflexive behaviour
of agents in producing a structurally coherent, apparently self-reproducing
social configuration – marked in some cases by systematic contradictions or
patterned incoherence. This is where the SRA makes its most distinctive
contribution to a critical realist analysis of structure and agency. The
emergence of relatively structured coherence out of potentially unstructured
complexity can be understood in terms of the continuing interaction between
the reflexive reorganisation of strategic selectivities and the recursive
selection and retention (or evolutionary stabilisation) of specific strategies
STRUCTURE AGENCY
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Figure 1: A Strategic-Relational Approach to Structure and Agency
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and tactics oriented to those selectivities. ‘Structured coherence’ (or stability)
involves a structurally-inscribed strategic selectivity that rewards actions
compatible with the recursive reproduction of the structure(s) in question.
Nonetheless, for the SRA, this coherence is always multiply tendential. First,
since the reproduction of structures is only ever tendential, so too are their
strategic selectivities; second, since structures cannot guarantee their self-
reproduction but only privilege some strategies and actors over others, there
is always scope for actions to overflow or circumvent structural constraints;
third, since subjects are never unitary, never fully aware of the conditions of
strategic action, never fully equipped to realize their preferred strategies,
and always face possible opposition from actors pursuing other strategies
or tactics, failure is an ever-present possibility; and, fourth, institutions often
embody structural contradictions and create strategic dilemmas.
A major advantage of the SRA as developed here and elsewhere is its
explicit concern with the spatio-temporality of structures, agents, and agency
and its integration of this into the initial presentation of the core concepts
rather than their subsequent introduction on an ad hoc basis. These spatio-
temporal properties are best discovered through retroduction about the real
– a movement that Giddens, for example, rejects because it risks reifying
structure as prior to rather than co-produced through agency (COS, pp25-
26, 180). First, structures emerge in specific places and at specific times, operate
on one or more particular scales and with specific temporal horizons of action,
have their own specific ways of articulating and interweaving their various
spatial and temporal horizons of action, develop their own specific capacities
to stretch social relations and/to compress events in space and time, and, in
consequence, have their own specific spatial and temporal rhythms. Such
features are not accidental or secondary but are constitutive properties that
help to distinguish one organisation, institution, institutional order, or
structural configuration from another. Second, all structures privilege the
adoption, as a condition for success, of certain spatial and temporal horizons
of action by those seeking to control, resist, reproduce, or transform it. Thus
the spatio-temporal selectivity of an organisation, institution, institutional
ensemble, or structural configuration involves the diverse modalities in and
through which spatial and temporal horizons of action in different fields are
produced, spatial and temporal rhythms are created, and some practices and
strategies are privileged and others made more difficult to realize according
to how they ‘match’ the temporal and spatial patterns inscribed in the relevant
structures. Spatio-temporal matrices are always differentially distantiated and
compressed; and strategies and tactics can be oriented to the most appropriate
spatio-temporal horizons, to changing the forms of spatio-temporal
governance, the reflexive narration of past and present to change the future,
and so on. And, third, a short-term constraint for a given agent or set of
agents could become a conjunctural opportunity over a longer time horizon
if there is a shift in strategy. This in turn implies that agents may be able to
pursue different types of alliance strategy and so modify the selective impact
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upon themselves and others of social structural (including, a fortiori,
institutional) constraints and opportunities. Likewise, regarding the spatial
dimension of strategic contexts, this approach implies that, since agents may
be able to operate across variable spatial scales as well as across several time
horizons, spatial structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities are
also determined in a ‘strategic-relational’ manner.
It is in this context that one can study the spatio-temporal dialectics
involved in strategy and tactics and the spatio-temporal dialectics of path-
dependency and path-shaping (for a discussion of this in Giddens, for
example, see COS pp319-24). Path-dependency implies that a structure’s
prior development shapes current and future trajectories and possibilities
for structural transformation and innovation. However, while history makes
a difference, it does not condemn actors to endless repetition. For, not only
can a molecular transformation occur through the gradual accumulation of
the unintended consequences of social action, but social forces could also
intervene in current conjunctures and actively re-articulate them so that
new trajectories become possible. Individual, collective, or organisational
reflexivity is significant here insofar as it involves second-order observation
of the respective agents’ situation and actions and their repercussions on
their identity and interests. From a strategic-relational perspective, moreover,
such reflexivity could (and should) include reflection on the specific spatio-
temporal selectivities of structures and the appropriateness of different
spatio-temporal horizons of action. When acted upon this could lead to the
reflexive reorganisation of spatio-temporal matrices and to changes in
recursively selected strategies and tactics.
***
Like other versions of critical realism in the social sciences, the SRA insists
on the ontological distinctiveness of structure and agency and develops an
epistemology for exploring their complex interaction. This much it shares
with Bhaskar’s TMSA and Archer’s morphogenetic theory and, in this sense,
it can be interpreted as one particular version among others of a critical
realist approach to structure and agency. It differs from both alternatives in
three main respects. First, it unfolds the dialectical interplay of structure
and agency in a more complex manner, pushing it beyond the initial level
at which the TMSA and morphogenetic theory are introduced. However,
given the common starting point in critical realism, there is nothing that
prevents adherents of the TMSA and morphogenetic theory from developing
the logic of their approach in the same direction. Failure to have done so
hitherto may be due to a limited concern with social research in the case of
the TMSA and of a limited degree and range of applications so far in the
case of morphogenetic theory. Second, the SRA goes beyond both
approaches in their present form by arguing immediately and explicitly
that the facticity and fixity of structures have no meaning outside the context
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of specific agents pursuing specific strategies – even if the latter are expressed
at the level of practical consciousness rather than in an explicit, reflexive
manner. It is this feature that justifies its proponents’ identification of the
SRA as strategic-relational in its orientation. Other approaches also recognise
this, of course, as shown in Giddens’s resort to the conjunctural analysis of
structural constraints. And, third, the SRA gives more explicit and immediate
attention than do Bhaskar and Archer to the emergent spatio-temporal
properties of structures and agency – not just in terms of their spatio-
temporal coordinates and extension but also in terms of their inherent spatio-
temporal properties, spatio-temporal selectivities, and spatio-temporal
horizons of action. This innovation is crucial for an adequate analysis of
structurally-inscribed selectivities. For one cannot adequately conceptualise
structural constraints outside specific time-horizons and spatial scales of
action since any constraint could be rendered inoperable through competent
actors’ choice of longer-term and/or spatially more appropriate strategies
that are concerned to disrupt or reconfigure the existing hierarchies of
structures (including institutions) and the selective patterns of constraint
and opportunity with which they are associated.
It is these three theoretical advances that distinguish the SRA from its
principal alternatives in critical realism. For it interprets structures in terms
of the structurally-inscribed spatio-temporal strategic selectivities inherent
in particular patterns of social relations. It examines actors in terms of their
capacities to engage in strategic-context analysis and to reflexively reorganise
structures over different spatio-temporal horizons to modify their
selectivities. It studies how the recursive selection of strategies and structures
produces relatively stable configurations with structural coherence and
mutually reinforcing patterns of conduct. And it emphasizes that the
emergence of relatively stable structural ensembles involves not only the
conduct of agents and their conditions of action but also the very constitution
of agents, identities, interests, and strategies. This co-constitution is always
deeply problematic because structures and their associated structural
tendencies (including their various selectivities) are never fully constituted
but remain vulnerable to transformation, dependent on continued action
along certain lines for their reproduction. It is also deeply problematic
because agents are never fully constituted as single-minded and
omnicompetent supports of structures but typically have a plurality of
identities, interests, desires, and affects as well as differing and variable
degrees of knowledgeability and practical competence This ensures that
structures are never reproduced through self-identical repetition but that
the future remains pregnant with a surplus of possibilities. It is the explicit
concern of the SRA with these possibilities in the relativity, relationality,
and contingency of its core concepts that enables it to provide a ‘distinctive
linkage between social ontology, explanatory methodology and practical
social theorising’ (RST, pp15-16).
